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ABSTRACT
SINIAPKIN, ARIELLE Survival processing and false memories. Department of
Psychology, June 2013.
ADVISOR: Daniel Burns
Some researchers speculate memory systems are adaptations that arose to enable

the storage of survival related information. Supporting this view, information processed
for survival relevance and death relevance has been shown to produce a memory
advantage that is superior to deep processing control conditions. While these procedures
increase recall, the information retrieved is not necessarily accurate. The purpose of the
present study was to investigate the effects of survival processing and death processing
on the formation of false memories. In addition, through analyses of cumulative recall
curves the extent of relational and item-specific processing was examined to explore the
proximate mechanisms underlying the effects.
Participants were placed into a survival, death, moving, or pleasantness condition. They
were instructed to rate lists of words, which have been shown to produce false memories,
for their relevance to the given scenarios. It was predicted that if death processing and
survival processing are related, then participants would recall a similar number of list
items and false memories. Although not significant, analyses of the surprise memory
task revealed the survival condition had the highest numerical recall of list items, while
the death condition had the lowest. The death condition significantly differed from the
other conditions by producing the highest recall of false memories. The survival
condition did not lead to an increase in false memories. Overall, the results suggest
survival and dying scenarios do not share similar underlying mechanisms.
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SURVIVAL PROCESSING: AN OVERVIEW
Typically, evolutionary theories are used to explain modern day occurrences

(Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2007). These inferences can be problematic because
evolutionary explanations often rely solely on logic; researchers cannot delve into the
minds of human ancestors, or know with certainty the conditions prevalent in ancestral
environments, thus they are unable to produce empirical evidence for their hypotheses.
Instead of observing a modern day phenomenon and trying to explain the
occurrence through evolutionary theory, however, researchers occasionally use
evolutionary reasoning to make predictions about human behavior. Researchers are
currently using this approach to speculate on the development of human memory (Nairne
et al., 2007). Why do we have memories? From an evolutionary perspective, episodic
memories are adaptations that allow humans to reflect on episodes from the past not
simply to reminisce, but to plan for the future (e.g., Kahneman, 2010). According to
researchers, memory systems formed as a result of evolutionary pressures (Nairne et al.,
2007). By storing survival-relevant information, such as the location of food resources or
dangerous predators, memories increase the genetic fitness of individuals by enhancing
their likelihood of surviving and reproducing (Nairne et al.).
If memory systems are adaptations, then memory systems should be the most
efficient in situations reminiscent of the ancestral contexts they arose from (Nairne et al.,
2007). Furthermore, if memory systems evolved because they enabled individuals to
store information related to survival, then our modern memory systems should also be
sensitive to processing and encoding survival related information. Additionally, if
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memory systems are attuned for encoding this particular type of information, then
instilling thoughts of survival should enhance memory recollection (Nairne et al., 2007).
In order to explore one possible reason underlying the evolution of human
memory: that memory systems evolved to store survival-relevant information, Nairne et
al. (2007) examined how well stimuli were remembered when they were processed for
their survival relevance. Individuals in the experimental condition were instructed to
imagine themselves deserted in the grasslands of a foreign land, lacking basic materials
necessary for survival. They were informed over the next few months they would need to
find food, water, and a means of protecting themselves from predators. Next, they were
instructed to rate common nouns for their survival significance, while those in the control
condition rated the same nouns for their personal significance, pleasantness, or relevance
to moving to a foreign land (Nairne al., 2007). Next, participants were given a distractor
task before the administration of a surprise memory test. Across four experiments, the
researchers found participants’ memory systems were more responsive to the encoding of
nouns processed for their survival relevance than for all other conditions. In other words,
both recall and recognition was higher for the survival group than for any of the control
groups.
Nairne al. (2007) wanted to extend their findings and rule out alternative
possibilities that could explain the survival processing advantage. They found the
survival processing effect for both within-, as well as between-subject designs. They
questioned whether the level of processing might be deeper for survival than the other
conditions. As a result, they used a self-referencing task as a comparison group in their
fourth experiment. This task instills a deep, semantic level of processing that presumably
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is not related to survival. They obtained the same recall advantage for the survival
condition, suggesting that survival processing significantly enhances retention above that
produced by self-referential processing. In addition, they also measured reaction times,
or the amount of time individuals spent making decisions regarding the relevance of the
nouns to the scenarios or their pleasantness value. They speculated if individuals spent
longer amounts of time making decisions in the survival condition than in the other
conditions, then reaction time might be the reason for the survival enhancement effect.
They found no difference, however, in participants’ reaction times across conditions.
Finally, they wanted to examine whether the enhancement was due to the beneficial
effects of congruous target encodings: individuals who rate the words highly are more
likely to remember the words than if they rate them lower (see Nairne et al., 2007).
Consequently, if participants rated the nouns on average more highly in the survival
condition compared with the other conditions then the results could be attributed to this
congruity effect. The researchers found no significant difference in ratings between
conditions and were thus able to rule out the influence of this effect. Overall, participants
who rated common nouns for their survival relevance had the best recall and recognition
in their studies. Therefore, their results support the notion our memory systems evolved
to give humans a unique survival advantage by recording survival related information
(Nairne al., 2007).
In accordance with Nairne et al.’s findings (2007), Weinstein, Bugg and Roediger
(2008) first replicated their original experiment and also found a significant difference
between individuals placed into the grassland survival scenario and those assigned to
other deep processing conditions. They also claimed the elaborateness of the instructions
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might have caused participants to process the scenario more deeply, which in turn lead to
the memory enhancements. Thus, in their second experiment, they tested whether the
recall advantage continued when the control condition matched the survival processing
condition in terms of schematic processing, or level of detail given to the scenario. For
their new scenario, they used an urban, modern environment that only differed from the
survival scenario in terms of the situations’ evolutionary relevance. They found
individuals who rated words for survival relevance and were placed into the grasslands
scenario had superior recall to those placed into the city scenario. This finding suggests
modern memory systems have ancestral priorities, which provides further support for an
evolutionary account of human memory.
Exploring the survival processing enhancement effect further, a subsequent study
conducted by Nairne and Padeirada (2010) replicated and extended Weintein et al.’s
(2008) results. In the study, the researchers focused on the ultimate mechanism(s)
underlying the processing advantage. They used two survival scenarios in their study:
participants either read about an ancestral environment, the grasslands, or about a modern
environment, a city, before they were given a word list that they would later be asked to
recall. They found that participants who imagined being placed in the grasslands
scenario had greater recall of list words than participants who imagined being placed in
the city scenario. They concluded our memory systems are sensitive to ancestral
priorities, and attuned to encoding survival related data. The responsiveness of memory
systems to ancestral environments provides further support for the theory that memories
are the result of evolutionary pressures (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010).
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On the other hand, when Soderstrom and McCabe (2011) tried to replicate these

findings, they found no difference between participants’ recall rates for the modern, or
city, and the ancestral, or grasslands scenarios. Further, they found recall was actually
greater for participants who were placed into the modern survival scenario where
zombies were described as the threat compared with participants placed into the ancestral
scenario where predators were the threat, thereby challenging the notion human memory
adapted for survival processing and would therefore be most efficient in ancestral
environments.
Further illuminating the strength of the survival processing effect, Nairne,
Pandeirada, and Thompson (2008) found recall for survival processing of items was
greater than recall for deep processing control conditions which included: imaginal
processing, pleasantness rating, generation, and intentional memory. Bell, Roer, and
Buchner (2013) also conducted a study testing the generalizability of the survival
processing effect. They used a suicide scenario as a comparison group, and found
participants given the survival scenario had superior recall when compared with those in
the suicide scenario. Thus, the survival processing effect does not appear to be due to
enhanced processing resulting from the negativity of the subject matter.
The	
  findings	
  across	
  various	
  experiments	
  demonstrate	
  the	
  strength	
  of	
  the	
  
survival	
  processing	
  enhancement	
  effect.	
  Overall,	
  the	
  researchers’	
  discoveries	
  that	
  
memories	
  are	
  enhanced	
  when	
  participants	
  are	
  instructed	
  to	
  rate	
  words	
  for	
  their	
  
survival	
  relevance	
  support	
  the	
  notion	
  our	
  memory	
  systems	
  resulted	
  from	
  
evolutionary	
  pressures.	
  	
  The	
  survival	
  processing	
  enhancement	
  effect	
  appears	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  
result	
  of	
  this	
  adaptation	
  that	
  is	
  visible	
  today.	
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Survival Processing: Proximate Mechanisms
While researchers have speculated about the ultimate reasons for the survival

processing enhancement effect, some have begun to study the proximate mechanisms.
For example, Burns, Burns and Hwang (2011) questioned whether differences in itemspecific and relational processing could explain the effect. They analyzed cumulativerecall curves, and measured item gains, and item losses over subsequent memory tests in
order to assess differences in item-specific and relational processing. Because I plan to
use several of these measures, they will be will described next.
Item-specific processing occurs when individuals encode distinctive
characteristics of individual items, thereby providing unique retrieval cues for each item.
Relational processing occurs when individuals encode how items relate to one another.
Therefore, this type of processing creates an organized retrieval plan for the encoded
information.
In order to differentiate between item-specific and relational processing, the
analysis of cumulative-recall curves may be used. It has been shown that item-specific
processing produces more gradual cumulative-recall curves that consistently approach
asymptotic levels when compared with relational processing (e.g., Burns & Schoff,
1998). The assumption is that when an individual uses item-specific processing, the cues
they encode aid in single-item retrieval only, which accounts for the slower, steadier
recall. On the other hand, relational processing produces cumulative-recall curves with
steeper initial slopes that taper off more quickly as they approach asymptotic levels
because the relational cues provide a systematic method of recovery of the list items,
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which results in rapid initial recall of word items that have been grouped together (e.g.,
Burns & Schoff, 1998).
Burns (1993) also argued that item-specific and relational processing can be
deduced by looking at the number of item gains and item losses in a repeated testing
procedure, whereby participants are given multiple recall tests in a row without any
additional studying between testing. The amount of relational processing an individual
uses is inversely related to item losses, or the number of items forgotten across
subsequent recall tests, because relational processing provides organized retrieval of the
list items, where the same relational cues are used across different tests. Moreover, the
amount of item-specific processing an individual uses is directly related to item gains, or
the number of new items that are recalled across subsequent tests that are not recalled
during the first test. An increase in item-gains is indicative of item specific processing
because there are many potential retrieval cues for each item, and some cues that are not
used on the first test may be used on later tests (Burns, 1993).
Through the examination of cumulative-recall curves, Burns, et al. (2011) have
examined the proximate mechanisms likely underlying the survival processing
enhancement effect. Across four experiments, they found survival processing produced
superior recall to conditions that elicited only relational processing, or only item-specific
processing. However, when control conditions had both relational and item-specific
processing, the survival enhancement effect disappeared. The cumulative-recall curves
illustrated the survival-rating task produced a significantly steeper curve than the one
produced by the pleasantness group. However, survival processing tended to produce
superior performance only in the later portions of the recall period compared to
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conditions performing only relational processing. Their results signify that survival
processing most likely promotes both relational and item-specific processing, which
makes it unique because most control conditions produce only one type of processing.
Burns, Hart, Griffith and Burns (2012) decided to test this two-process
explanation using non-survival scenarios as control conditions, rather than pleasantness
rating. In both a between-lists and within-list design, researchers found participants in
the survival scenario had improved recall relative to those in the moving scenario. Based
on their analysis of cumulative-recall curves, which showed that the recall difference
only emerged late in the recall period, it was concluded that the difference in recall was
caused by a difference in the level of item-specific processing, and not relational
processing. Thus, while survival processing enhances both item specific and relational
processing, the overall memory advantage relative to other scenarios may be due only to
greater item-specific processing.
False Memories
Researchers have begun to assess the accuracy of the memories that are elicited
by the survival processing effect. In particular, they have examined the effects of
survival processing on participants’ memories using the Deese, Roediger, and
McDermott (DRM) procedure, which is a popular research method for creating and
studying false memories, or recollections of information that is never directly presented
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
How are false memories created?
Fuzzy trace theory asserts that during the formation of a new memory an
individual creates two memory traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Reyna & Brainerd,
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1995). The first trace is a detailed description, while the second trace has semantic value
and is a more general overview of the information being stored. According to theorists,
the second trace remains in memory much longer than the first trace. Thus, if a lot of
time elapses between encoding and retrieval of a particular memory, then individuals will
use the second “fuzzier” trace, which ultimately leads to a higher instance of false
recollections.
Alternatively, some researchers argue source-monitoring theory adequately
explains the formation of false memories (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). The
theory proposes if individuals do not encode sufficient detail in memory, the lack of
information does not allow accurate determination of the source of the information as
either internal or external. Therefore, upon retrieval an individual must make a judgment
call as to the source of the information. Occasionally, this decision making process
results in misattributions. Typically, externally generated memories are more elaborate.
If an imaginary event is given a lot of detail, however, an individual may incorrectly
attribute the memory to an external source, thereby creating a false memory of the event.
Activation Monitoring theory is an extension of the source monitoring view, and
is now more prominent than both the original source monitoring theory, and spreading
activation theory (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo,
2001). This theory, which lays the basis for the DRM procedure, contends semantically
related words cause particular concepts to become activated, or more readily brought to
consciousness, and once activated individuals misremember the related concept as being
externally generated because of source identification failure.
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All of these theories have been used to explain the formation of false memories in

the DRM procedure. During this procedure, participants are presented a series of word
lists comprised of list items that are all centered around one critical item, which is not
presented on the list. For example, list items may include: bed, rest, tired, dream, and
slumber, which all center around the critical lure, sleep. Typically, researchers find
participants false recognize or recall the critical lure as frequently as they remember list
items. Individuals are also confident in their assertions that the false memories are in fact,
true (e.g., Payne, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996).
Exploring the mechanisms underlying illusory memories, Burns, Martens,
Bertoni, Sweeny, and Lividini (2006) analyzed cumulative-recall curves, item gains, and
item losses of both list items and critical lures using the DRM paradigm, or false memory
procedure, on multiple tests. The first experiment examined item gains and losses in
order to compare the amount of relational and item-specific processing participants
perform on critical lures and list items. Participants were informed they would hear a list
of words presented that they would later be asked to recall. They were given several
DRM lists in succession before they were asked to recall all of the words. An analysis of
the cumulative recall curves revealed the critical lures had slower, steadier recall when
compared with the list items. Further, critical lures produced more item gains, and list
items produced fewer item losses across successive tests. These findings lead the
researchers to infer the list items received more relational processing, while the critical
lures received more item-specific processing.
The researchers proposed two possible hypotheses to explain the surprising
finding that critical lures seemed to receive more item specific processing when
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compared with list items. First, critical lures may receive more conceptual detail as a
result of being activated by the list items. Second, critical lures may receive relational
processing, but the encoded relational information is not used as part of the individual’s
retrieval scheme.
According to the first hypothesis, if critical lures receive more detail, then they
should continue to receive item-specific processing when physically presented in the list.
They should also have more item gains than list items across successive tests. If the
second explanation is correct, then physically presenting critical items in the list should
cause relational information to be integrated into the retrieval plan.
To test between these two explanations, they conducted an experiment where they
replaced one list item from each of the ten DRM word lists with the critical lure (Burns et
al., 2006). By physically presenting the critical lure, the researchers allowed the critical
lures to be used in the participant’s retrieval plan. After examining cumulative-recall
curves, researchers found the critical items continued to receive more item-specific
processing, but also received relational processing, to the extent that they received as
much relational processing as the other list items. In their final experiment, when they
presented critical items to participants that were less related to the other list items they
found the critical lures’ item-gain advantage from the initial experiments was eliminated.
Thus, they concluded critical items that are not physically presented receive more itemspecific processing than list items because of their strong association to the other list
items, which causes an increase in activation. Their findings also support the contention
that critical lures are only incorporated into an organized retrieval plan if they are
physically presented in the DRM list.
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False Memories in Survival Processing
If survival processing is a result of natural selection, Otgar and Smeets argued that

it should prioritize the encoding of true memories while minimizing false recollections
(2010). They used net accuracy scores, or ratios of true recall to true recall plus false
recall, to examine the accuracy of adults’ adaptive memories. They found no recall
advantage in terms of net accuracy for survival processing because survival processing
increased both true and false memories. However, they noted that these false memories
may not necessarily be maladaptive, but could be viewed as side effects of an adaptive
memory strategy, namely the ability to attend to survival-related materials by scanning
the environment quickly, and efficiently while gleaning survival-related information.
Even if the information is not entirely accurate, if it is relevant to one’s survival
processing it still may enhance an individual’s ability to survive. For instance, if an
individual falsely recalls the location of a predator within the environment, the false
information may cause them to be more cautious, and attune to other possible dangers
within the environment, which ultimately increases his or her genetic fitness.
Howe and Derbish (2010) found that not only does survival processing produce
high true and false recall, but survival-related words (battle, conflict, disease) were also
better recalled and were more susceptible to the false memory illusion than negative or
neutral words that were not survival relevant, regardless of whether an intentional
memory paradigm or incidental memory task was used. Further, survival-related
concepts, such as injury and death were more likely to promote false memories than
control concepts, exemplifying the broadness of the effect. Based on these findings,
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humans appear to process survival information differently than other materials, which
cause an increase in false recognition and recall.
Death and Survival Processing
Theorists have speculated that survival processing may activate numerous
encoding mechanisms (Nairne et al., 2007). Recently, some researchers speculated the
memorial benefits that occur from thoughts of survival might be the result of death
related cognitions (e.g., Burns, Hart, & Kramer, 2013). This assumption is logical
because thoughts of death and survival are both evolutionarily significant, and highly
related.
Burns, et al.(2013) reasoned if survival processing leads to mortality salience,
then dying scenarios that preclude survival processing should produce the same memory
benefits as those produced by survival scenarios. In order to test this assumption, they
constructed a dying scenario where participants were instructed to imagine being
diagnosed as terminally ill with no hope of survival, thereby eliminating survival
processing. Over the course of three experiments, they compared the dying scenario with
the classic grasslands survival scenario as well as a pleasantness rating control group.
They attempted to closely match the scenarios in terms of thematic structure,
concreteness, and detail. Additionally, pilot tests were conducted to ensure the list items
were equally matched for their relevance to each scenario. They found memory recall for
death processing was equal to the memory recall for survival processing. Thinking about
dying, without thoughts of survival, activates a recall advantage that is similar to the
survival processing advantage. Therefore, their studies point to overlapping mechanisms
between survival and death processing. In contrast, when Klein (2012) and Bell et al.
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(2013) conducted a similar study, they found death scenarios did not produce memorial
benefits to the same extent as survival scenarios. However, the researchers, did not
control for word relevance or equate the death and survival scenarios in their studies,
which casts doubts upon the soundness of their conclusions.
The Present Study
The association between survival processing and death processing, however,
remains largely unexplored. The current study attempts to more thoroughly examine the
relationship between survival processing and death processing. Specifically, the present
study was designed to compare the effects of survival processing and death processing on
the creation of false memories using the DRM paradigm to elucidate whether the
proximate mechanisms underlying the two effects are similar. If the two are similar, then
dying scenarios should produce false memories to the same extent as the survival
scenarios.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups: survival processing,
death processing, moving or pleasantness. Both the moving and pleasantness groups were
used as control conditions. Participants were shown DRM word lists, and depending on
their randomly assigned group, they were instructed to rate the relevance of each DRM
word to surviving, moving, or death, or to rate its pleasantness value. The rating scale
used ranged from 1-4, with 1 being extremely irrelevant or unpleasant, and 4 being
extremely relevant or pleasant.
Through an examination of item-gains, losses, and cumulative-recall curves the
outcomes for the pleasantness and moving control conditions will be used to compare
against both the survival and death processing conditions to determine the extent that
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participants utilize item-specific and relational processing while encoding words in the
experimental conditions. Based on previous studies, the pleasantness rating control
condition, which is known to induce item-specific processing of DRM list items, should
cause a decrease in false memories. Therefore, if survival processing increases itemspecific processing of the DRM list items, there should also be a decrease in the
occurrence of false memories, and a pattern similar to the pleasantness rating control
condition. If, on the other hand, survival processing increases relational processing of the
DRM list items, then we would expect to see an increase in item-specific processing of
the critical lures, and an increase in the prevalence of false memories. Further, if death
processing has similar proximate mechanisms to survival processing, then participants’
recall rates of false memories should be equivalent, and the cumulative recall curves
should also be similar.
Method
Participants
Eighty-seven undergraduate students at Union College participated in this experiment.
However, one participant’s data was not used because they failed to follow the
instructions to recall the words presented on the computer screen, and instead recalled the
words presented on the PANAS scale. In exchange for their involvement, participants
received either six dollars, or credit towards their introductory psychology or research
methods course activities requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the
four groups, and they were tested individually in separate rooms. Sessions lasted for
approximately forty-five minutes. Twenty participants were tested in the death and
pleasantness conditions, twenty-one in the survival condition, and twenty-two in the
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moving condition.
Materials
DRM lists. Participants were presented with one long list that consisted of ten shorter
lists composed of 10 words each (see Appendix A). All of the 10 words within each list
were semantically related, for example, “bed, rest, tired and dream” moreover, all of the
10 words within each list centered on a word (the critical lure) that was not presented. In
the example above, all of the words were related to the critical lure, sleep. A pilot study
was conducted to ensure that the final list of items used were equally congruent to the
survival, dying, and moving scenarios. In the pilot study, participants were instructed to
rate list items selected from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo’s (2001) study for
their relevance to survival, dying, and moving. Afterwards, the mean survival, dying,
and moving rating, was computed for each word. Ten word lists containing ten words
within each list were chosen based on the mean ratings such that overall the mean ratings
for the three scenarios were nearly identical (Survival= 2.20, Death= 2.11, Moving=
2.18)
Design and procedure
A between-subjects design with the following conditions functioning as different levels
of a single independent variable was used: death, survival, moving, and pleasantness. The
four conditions differed with respect to the instructions they were read regarding the
word rating task.
Participants were read one of the following sets of instructions:
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Survival. “In this task, we would like you to imagine you are stranded in the grasslands
of a foreign land, without any basic survival materials. Over the next few months, you’ll
need to find steady supplies of food and water and protect yourself from predators. We
are going to show you a list of words, and we would like you to rate how relevant each of
these words would be for you in this survival situation. Some of the words may be
relevant and others may not. It is up to you to decide.
We would like you to rate each word on a 1-4 scale, where 1 = totally irrelevant, 2 =
somewhat irrelevant, 3 = somewhat relevant, & 4 = totally relevant. You will rate the
words by pressing the 1, 2, 3, or 4 key. You have four seconds to respond. Please try
your best to respond before the four seconds are up.
After you have rated all of the words, the computer will ask you to wait for further
instructions. When you see that message, please open the door to your cubicle.
Are there any questions?”

Moving. “In this task, we would like you to imagine that you are planning to move to a
new home in a foreign land. Over the next few months, you’ll need to locate and
purchase a new home and transport your belongings.
We are going to show you a list of words and we would like you to rate how relevant
each of these words would be for you in this moving situation. Some of the words may
be relevant and others may not. It’s up to you to decide.
We would like you to rate each word on a 1-4 scale, where 1 = totally irrelevant, 2 =
somewhat irrelevant, 3 = somewhat relevant, & 4 = totally relevant. You will rate the
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words by pressing the 1, 2, 3, or 4 key. You have four seconds to respond. Please try
your best to respond before the four seconds are up.
After you have rated all of the words, the computer will ask you to wait for further
instructions. When you see that message, please open the door to your cubicle.
Are there any questions?”

Pleasantness. “In this task, you will be shown a series of words one at a time. Your task
is to rate how pleasant or unpleasant each word seems to you. Some of the words may be
pleasant to you and others may not be pleasant. It is up to you to decide.
We would like you to rate each word on a 1-4 scale, where 1 = totally unpleasant, 2 =
somewhat unpleasant, 3 = somewhat pleasant, & 4 = totally pleasant. You will rate the
words by pressing the 1, 2, 3, or 4 key. You have four seconds to respond. Please try
your best to respond before the four seconds are up.
After you have rated all of the words, the computer will ask you to wait for further
instructions. When you see that message, please open the door to your cubicle.
Are there any questions?”
Death. “In this task, we would like you to imagine that you have been diagnosed as
terminally ill, with no hope of surviving. Over the next few months, you’ll need to give
away your belongings, say good bye to loved ones, and find ways to ease your suffering.
We are going to show you a list of words and we would like you to rate how relevant
each of these words would be for you in this dying situation. Some of the words may be
relevant and others may not. It’s up to you to decide. We would like you to rate each
word on a 1-4 scale, where 1 = totally irrelevant, 2 = somewhat irrelevant, 3 = somewhat
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relevant, & 4 = totally relevant. You will rate the words by pressing the 1, 2, 3, or 4 key.
You have four seconds to respond. Please try your best to respond before the four
seconds are up. After you have rated all of the words, the computer will ask you to wait
for further instructions. When you see that message, please open the door to your
cubicle. Are there any questions?
All of the words were presented one at a time on the computer screen. They were
presented in the same order for all participants, with each word shown for 4 seconds.
Two practice words were included to make sure the participants had time to adjust to, and
fully understood, the procedure. Participants were given no information regarding the
upcoming recall task. Following the word-rating task, participants were given a packet.
The first page of the packet was the positive and negative affect scale (PANAS), which
was presented both to delay recall and to assess possible changes in affect resulting from
exposure to the different scenarios. Participants were given a 2.5-minute distractor task
(The PANAS), where they were given 20 words describing feelings or emotions and were
told, to rate on a 1-5 scale the extent to which each word described how they were feeling
at the\at moment.
Following the PANAS, participants were given a 10 minute long surprise recall task.
They were told, “In a moment, I am going to ask you to remember and write-down as
many of the words that you saw earlier on the computer screen as you can. These are the
words you rated on the 1-4 scale, not the words you just rated on the piece of paper.
Please be reasonably sure the word was presented before writing it down. You can write
the words down in any order you like. You don't have to write them in the order they
were shown. You will be given plenty of time to write-down the words. However, every
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so often, you will hear the tape recorder say, "Now draw a line". When you hear this
message, please draw a line under the last word you just recalled, and then continue
trying to recall more words. If you haven't recalled any new words since the last time
you were asked to draw a line, then draw a second line under the last line. Are there any
questions?” The recall task lasted 10 minutes.
Results
For each participant the PANAS produced a positive and negative affect score.
The mean affect scores are presented in Table 1. The mean positive and negative affect
scores were relatively consistent across the four conditions. A oneway between subjects
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effects of the different
levels of the independent variable: survival, death, moving, or pleasantness rating group
on positive and negative affect. The ANOVA revealed no significant difference between
conditions in positive affect or negative affect, F (3, 82) = 0.236, p > .05and F (3, 82) =
0.244, p > .05.
The total recall of list items, total recall of critical lures, and the total number of
intrusions for each of the four conditions of the experiment are also displayed in Table 1.
On average, the survival condition had the highest total recall of list items, followed by
the moving, pleasantness, and death conditions. Those in the death condition had the
highest number of false memories, followed by the moving, survival, and pleasantness
groups. Further, the moving group had the greatest recall of intrusions, or words that
were neither critical lures nor list items, followed by the death, survival, and pleasantness
groups.
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A one-way between subject ANOVA showed that there was no significant

difference between conditions in the overall recall of list items, F (3, 82) = 0.238 p > .05.
A significant difference was found between conditions in the overall recall of critical
lures, F (3, 82) = 0.006, p > .05. Using the Tukey HSD test, post hoc comparisons
revealed the death condition significantly differed from the pleasantness condition in the
total number of false memories recalled. The survival and moving conditions did not
significantly differ from the other conditions.
An analysis of cumulative recall scores to determine the type of processing
participants in the various conditions performed on the recall scores is presented in
Figure 1. The figure illustrates the curves for the pleasantness, moving, and death
conditions were nearly identical. Further, the survival condition curve was considerably
higher than the curves produced by the other groups, and diverged early in the recall
period. This difference continued throughout the remainder of the ten minutes. As can
be seen, the survival curve initially approaches the asymptote at a rapid rate for the first
four minutes, before gradually tapering off for the remainder of the recall period.
An analysis of cumulative recall scores to determine the type of processing
participants in the various conditions performed on the critical lures is presented in
Figure 2. As can be seen, the death condition produced a curve higher than all other
conditions. Moreover, the death processing and moving condition curves were the most
similar initially with a rapid approach to the asymptote. Eventually, those in the moving
condition began to recall slightly fewer items than those in the death condition. The
pleasantness curve was the lowest; participants in this condition recalled the fewest false
memories. Those in the survival condition produced slightly more false memories than
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those in the pleasantness condition, but considerably less than those in the moving, and
death conditions. Both the survival and pleasantness conditions show slower, steadier
curves throughout the recall period when compared with the moving and death
conditions.

Discussion
The present experiment was designed to test whether rating words for their
survival significance, death significance, moving significance, and pleasantness value
would influence the formation of false memories utilizing the DRM paradigm. In
particular, the study investigated whether death processing and survival processing share
underlying mechanisms. It was predicted that if the two processes are similar, then
participants in the survival and death conditions should recall a similar number of list
items and critical lures. Cumulative-recall curves were assessed to analyze the extent
participants used item-specific and relational processing while encoding the words in the
various experimental conditions.
The results revealed no significant difference in positive or negative affect as a
function of condition This finding suggests the rating tasks had no influence over the
participants’ emotional states. Therefore, the results cannot be explained in terms of
participants’ emotional reactions to the various scenarios they were presented.
The results did not replicate previous findings, specifically Nairne et al.’s (2007)
original discovery, in which those placed into the survival-processing group experienced
a memory enhancement effect. Although the survival group appeared to do better
numerically than the other conditions with reference to the total number of list items
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recalled, the ANOVA produced no significant difference between conditions.
Participants’ memory systems were not more responsive to the encoding of words
processed for their relevance to survival when compared with moving, pleasantness, and
death conditions. If a larger sample size were used, the results may well have shown a
significant difference between groups on the total number of list items recalled, and
would have provided additional support for the memorial benefits brought about by
survival processing.
The cumulative recall of list items showed that participants given the survival
scenario had numerically greater recall than those in the moving scenario. Moreover, the
results are also consistent with Burns et al.’s (2011) discovery that survival-rating tasks
produce significantly higher curves than pleasantness-rating tasks.
As can be seen in Figure 1, during the first four minutes of recall, the steep initial
slope of the recall curve for the survival group implies more relational processing was
occurring relative to the other conditions. Overall, the death, moving, and pleasantness
conditions produced nearly identical recall curves. Following the first four minutes, all
four groups tended to recall the same amount during each minute, suggesting all groups
performed an equivalent amount of item-specific information. This finding is consistent
with Burns, et al.’s (2011) proposal that survival processing is superior to control
conditions that elicit either item specific or relational processing because survival
processing utilizes both item specific and relational processing during the encoding of
stimuli. Based on the current study, the traditional memory advantage conferred by
survival processing, to the extent that it occurred, may be due to a combination of both
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item specific and relational processing. These findings also imply dying and survival
scenarios do not result in similar underlying processes or mechanisms.
The results clearly contradict the Burns, Hart and Kramer (2013) finding that
dying scenarios precluding survival processing produce memorial benefits to the same
extent as survival scenarios. In the present study, the death condition produced the lowest
average total recall of list items, which was lower than both the moving and pleasantness
control conditions (Table 1). Therefore, processing words for their relevance to dying
does not appear to lead to memory improvements. It is not clear why the present study
failed to replicate previous findings. One possible reason for failing to replicate the
finding that death processing improves recall as much as survival processing is that in
previous studies words were unrelated to each other, whereas in the present study the
DRM words were related.
The results of the present study were consistent with Klein’s (2012) study, which
found the survival scenario produced the highest numerical recall, while the dying
scenario produced lower recall that was most similar to the pleasantness scenario recall.
Arguably, Klein’s findings may have been inaccurate because he failed to control for
word congruity. Word congruity is the finding that words given higher scores are
remembered better than words given lower scores on rating tasks. Therefore, although
word ratings were not analyzed for the current study, if the ratings had been the same
across the different groups then this similarity could explain the inability to replicate
previous studies that have found no difference in recall levels between survival and dying
scenarios.
Although the results showed no significant difference, the survival condition
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appeared to produce more false memories than the pleasantness condition, but fewer false
memories than both the moving and death conditions. Thus, Otgar and Smeets’ (2010)
and Howe and Derbish’s (2010) findings that survival processing increases the
prevalence of false memories were not replicated in the current study.
Interestingly, those in the death condition significantly differed from those in the
pleasantness control condition by producing the highest number of falsely recalled items
or critical lures. Thus, death processing in my study behaved in a similar manner to
survival processing in the Otgaar and Smeets (2010) and Howe and Derbish’s (2010)
study.
Evolutionary theory has the potential to explain this novel finding. When humans
first attained the ability to understand time, they began engaging in activities that would
benefit future survival, such as planting crops and establishing permanent settlements.
When there is anticipation and awareness of future events, resources are used with future
survival in mind. On the other hand, when the future appears uncertain, or bleak, limited
resources are invested for future endeavors. The mind may act in a similar manner.
When there is no hope for the future, which is what the participants in the death scenario
were instructed to imagine, there is no need to allocate cognitive resources to accurately
take in and thoroughly process incoming data. Those in the mortality salience group
might have reserved more mental energy when compared with the other groups when
engaging in the rating task, which could cause the increase in falsely recalled items. (Of
course, whereas this explanation accounts for my findings, it does not explain previous
findings of greater false memories following survival processing.)
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If false memories may be understood according to fuzzy trace theory, then those

in the death condition, because of the reduction in cognitive resources allocated to the
present task, might have encoded a less detailed initial trace, which could explain the
increase in false memories. In terms of source monitoring theory, when the information
was initially encoded for those in the death processing condition, the basis for the
information (either internal or external) would be less likely to be recorded in memory
because of the lower mental resources allocated to the task, and therefore individuals
would have been more likely to perceive the information as externally generated, leading
to an increase in the recall of the critical lures.
According to these explanations, however, the death group should have produced
the lowest recall of actual list words. Thus, these speculations cannot explain the finding
that the death group produced the highest recall of actual list words.
An additional anomaly that could explain the inability to replicate previous
findings is the group standard deviations for the recall scores of the present study were
quite large relative to typical recall standard deviations. Standard deviations for the recall
of list items for survival, dying, pleasantness, and moving were: 9.10, 7.04, 10.75, and
6.99 respectively. The high variability among participants’ recall scores suggests
participants might have approached the task using different techniques, or some might
have been more serious than others to cause the large standard deviations. In the future it
would be interesting to expound on the relationship between death processing and the
generation of false memories. Further research is necessary to elucidate the robustness of
the effect.
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Table 1.
Mean Performance Measures as a Function of the Type of Rating Task
________________________________________________________________________
Survival

Dying

Pleasantness

Moving

Performance Measure
Mean SD
Mean SD Mean SD
Mean SD
________________________________________________________________________
Positive Affect

2.70 0.55

Negative Affect

1.38

2.69 0.68

3.03 0.75

2.69 0.55

1.27 0.26

2.69 0.55

Total Recall List items

33.20 9.10 28.29 7.04 28.65 10.75

29.72 6.99

Total Recall Critical Lures

1.55 1.19

Total Recall Intrusions

1.65 2.03

0.26 1.54

2.46
2.83

0.59

1.56
3.34

1.20 0.70
0.70 0.57

1.91 1.06
3.73 4.07

________________________________________________________________________

	
  
Figure 1. Mean cumulative number of list items recalled correctly as a function of the
type of rating task.
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Figure 2. Mean cumulative number of items recalled correctly as a function of the type of
rating task.
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Appendix I

List words used in the present experiment in the order they were presented to
participants.Words in bold are critical lures.
Sleep
bed
rest
tired
dream
wake
blanket
slumber
snore
nap
peace

Smell
rose
nose
hear
see
whiff
scent
reek
stench
fragrance
perfume

Flag
freedom
pendant
symbol
stars
anthem
stripes
raised
national
checkered
emblem

Butterfly
moth
wing
bird
fly
yelllow
flower
cocoon
summer
color
worm

Music
rhythm
note
sound
sing
band
melody
horn
concert
instrument
art

Soft
light
pillow
plush
loud
cotton
fur
touch
fluffy
skin
tender

Mountain
hill
valley
climb
top
molehill
peak
plain
glacier
climber
ski

Girl
boy
female
young
dress
hair
niece
dance
aunt
daughter
sister

Beautiful
ugly
pretty
girls
woman
picture
lady
snow
scene
gorgeous
day
King
Queen
England
Crown
Prince
Dictator
Palace
Throne
Chess
Rule
Subjects
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